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The article contributes to the study of EU foreign policy decision-making processes by
analysing the links between national ofﬁcials working in the committees of the Council
of the EU and their capitals. Through an original dataset of 138 questionnaires (and
20 interviews) with national representatives, it explores the micro-foundations of the
formulation of EU foreign policy. It ﬁrst shows how, even in this most intergovernmen-
tal ﬁeld, diplomats in Brussels play a very important role in the policy process: only 30
per cent claim to always have a mandate and half state that they do not feel con-
strained by their capital. Next, it reveals that if (larger) member states attempt to retain
control of CFSP/CSDP negotiations, the effective discretion/autonomy these ofﬁcials
enjoy depends on the experience accumulated in the decision-making process,
and knowledge of the (formal and informal) links between Brussels and the home
department.
In recent years the study of the committees involved in the decision-making
process of the European Union (EU) has proved a very fruitful area of
research. Although their contribution to the work of the Council of the EU
(hereafter, the Council) may have been slightly exaggerated,
1 these committees
are said to settle approximately two-thirds of all the issues on the Council
agenda, and they have been described as the ‘backbone of the European sys-
tem of integration’ (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 98).
This article contributes to the debates on the committees of the Council by
analysing an overlooked aspect of their action (Häge 2007; Panke 2010) – the
links between national ofﬁcials working in these committees and their capitals.
In particular, it explores the micro-foundations of national policy – how (and
by whom) national positions are prepared. How often do civil servants in
Brussels have a mandate? To what extent do they enjoy leeway in their
negotiations? What factors explain these dynamics? In spite of some empirical
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 ﬁndings that increasingly reveal the important role played by the ofﬁcials in
Brussels (Egeberg et al. 2003; Kassim et al. 2001; Lewis 1998), intergovern-
mental analysis of the Council has generally ignored this relationship. Some-
what surprisingly, the literatures on socialisation and on the ‘deliberative turn’
in EU studies also have failed to take this relationship into account, and brack-
eted the domestic level. If EU committee members are socialised to a certain
extent, what impact do these (partial) socialisation processes have on the nego-
tiations of the Council? In other words, does a supranational identity held by
individual national ofﬁcials eventually translate into behavioural changes in
states, and, if so, how (Zürn and Checkel 2005)? Similarly, how normative
suasion can occur within these groups is unclear and often rests on implicit
assumptions. How is it possible to argue that Council committees are arenas
where diplomats ‘reason, discuss, deliberate and persuade’ (Niemann 2006:
468) without exploring the links between them and their capitals? One may
even argue that deliberation between representatives is a contradiction in terms
(Neyer 2006). Finally, investigating the control exercised by capitals over their
delegates in Brussels is useful from a normative perspective. The growing
importance of committees within the Council and the EU raised serious con-
cerns about the transparency and democratic accountability of the decision-
making process (Christiansen and Kirchner 2000; Rhinard 2002). As Häge puts
it (2008: 556), the more closely national capitals are involved in the elabora-
tion of the mandate, the less the accountability deﬁcit that exists.
2
Relying on an original dataset of 138 questionnaires and 20 interviews with
national ofﬁcials participating in the committees of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),
this article attempts to partially ﬁll this gap, while also contributing to our
knowledge of how EU foreign policy is made. The ‘committee turn’ in EU
studies has only partially addressed the area of foreign policy. If some
contributions have examined the historical development of CFSP committees
(e.g. Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006), other analyses have also revealed that
national foreign policies are often deﬁned through social interaction in
Brussels, and consensus-building is an essential feature of their negotiations
(Howorth 2010; Juncos and Pomorska 2006, 2011; Juncos and Reynolds
2007). This article continues along these lines, by applying the research
designs, the methodological instruments and the rigorous testing of hypotheses
widely used in the studies of the Council (Quaglia et al. 2008) to the activities
of CFSP/CSDP committees.
The article is organised as follows. The ﬁrst section clariﬁes and disentan-
gles the European–national nexus in the preparation of the national position.
Three dimensions are distinguished: (a) the quantity and quality of the man-
date; (b) the relevance of the capital for the activities of diplomats; and (c) the
margin of their autonomy. Furthermore, the dataset generated by the research
is introduced and methodological issues are considered. The second section
presents and discusses the empirical data for the three indicators, which allow
us to assess the role of the European and national layers of the national
National Capitals and Brussels in EU Foreign Policy 1053
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 administration in the formulation of the national position. The third section
aims at deepening the analysis: the three dimensions are used as dependent
variables, and a series of explanatory variables are introduced in order to
explain the differences in governmental control over their diplomats in Brus-
sels. Finally, the conclusion summarises the main ﬁndings and discusses their
implications for wider debates about European integration and EU foreign
policy.
Links between Brussels and the National Capital
The article explores the links between ofﬁcials in Brussels and the national
capitals, to determine the characteristics of their coordination, and to assess
their power relationship. As mentioned, studies of the Council – which have
generated a remarkable amount of data – have rarely investigated these
dynamics. Even when this is done, the context remains that of socialisation
(Beyers 2005; Beyers and Trondal 2004); or the aim is essentially comparative,
showing the many faces of EU committee governance (Egeberg et al.
2003).
At the same time, the literature on EU foreign policy has also paid scarce
attention to the European–domestic nexus. Broadly speaking, there are two dif-
ferent perspectives (ideal-types) on the CFSP/CSDP decision-making process.
The ﬁrst approach considers the CFSP as an intergovernmental project (Elias-
sen 1998; Jones 2007), where member states attempt to promote their own
interests (Allen 1996), national concerns take precedence, and a ‘logic of diver-
sity’ prevents relevant agreements being reached (Hoffmann 1966; Krotz
2009). The interplay between the European and domestic level is omitted, and
the national capital is – implicitly more than explicitly – assumed to formulate
the position, which is then defended and maximised in Brussels by national
diplomats. A second, institutional, perspective identiﬁes consensus and prob-
lem-solving as key features of EU foreign policy, where solutions to policy
problems are found in a collective deﬁnition of the issues, and references to
European identity and interests and the use of peer pressure are common attri-
butes (Smith 2004). The major role is said to be played by national ofﬁcials in
Brussels, who, socialised to European ideas and values, ‘see themselves … as
policy arbiters’ (Tonra 2001: 12) and form a ‘diplomatic republic of Europe’
(Jørgensen 1997). EU foreign policy is increasingly ‘Brusselised’ and formu-
lated by national diplomats in the Belgian capital (Juncos and Pomorska 2011).
The interaction between Brussels and the capitals, however, has not been ana-
lysed (see Juncos and Pomorska 2006 for an exception). Furthermore, these
accounts are mostly based on memoirs, unsystematic interviews and authorial
insights.
In other words, the micro-foundations of the formulation of EU (foreign)
policy are still largely unexplored. This article intends to analyse some aspects
of the skeleton of the vertical coordination between the national and European
1054 N. Chelotti
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 layers of the national administration, and to provide the literature on committee
governance and on the decision-making process of EU foreign policy with
evidence at the micro-level.
Three aspects are considered to deﬁne the links between Brussels and the
capital and to evaluate the practices and logics behind the formulation and
negotiation of the national position (Table 1). The ﬁrst is the quantity and qual-
ity of the national mandate. Mandate in this context refers to any formal or
informal set of instructions or guidelines from the capital that the European
level has to follow, represent and advance in EU negotiations. The characteris-
tics of the mandate can shed light on how national and EU (foreign) policies
are made. A mandate which is relatively unclear and not particularly detailed
would give diplomats participating in CFSP/CSDP committees greater scope to
formulate and represent the national position. Similarly, the absence of a man-
date would imply that Brussels diplomats have, at times, a considerable
amount of leeway in determining the position and can infuse CFSP/CSDP
negotiations with their own perspectives. By contrast, a clearly formulated,
detailed and frequent mandate generally
3 reﬂects a high degree of control exer-
cised by the domestic level over the activities of Brussels diplomats. The coor-
dination of national policies, then, is highly centralised. Most smaller EU
states, for instance, are said to have strongly capital-based coordination sys-
tems, with little input from Permanent Representations (PRs): Brussels diplo-
mats send documents and information back to the capitals and just ‘wait for
their instructions’ (Panke 2010: 773).
The second deﬁning feature concerns the source of information when dip-
lomats negotiate. The national level may inﬂuence the position to be defended
in Brussels well beyond the mandate. Delegates are embedded in their domes-
tic environment and even in the absence of negotiating instructions they can
still advance points of view, and use information and insights, elaborated more
broadly by the capital. On the other hand, considering the national administra-
tion as (only) one of the sources for their activities, and taking into account
information coming from the other member states or other actors – such as the
European Commission or the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy (HR) – reveals a more ﬂuid and dynamic dimension to the
CFSP/CSDP negotiations than is often assumed. This could potentially amount
to more than a lowest common denominator of member states’ exogenously
deﬁned positions, and could mean that they are potentially subject to a more
collective deﬁnition in Brussels by national ofﬁcials.
TABLE 1
LINKS BETWEEN NATIONAL CAPITAL AND BRUSSELS
Operationalisation Table
1. Quantity and quality of the mandate Questionnaire 2,3
2. Capital as source of information Questionnaire 4
3. Autonomy of the national ofﬁcials Questionnaire 4
National Capitals and Brussels in EU Foreign Policy 1055
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 Following these observations, the third element that identiﬁes the links
between the capital and the European level is the overall leeway national repre-
sentatives in Brussels enjoy. Investigating to what extent they feel restricted by
the national level in the negotiations they take part in
4 sheds further light on
the role the domestic and European layers of the national administration play
in the formulation of the national position and negotiation of EU foreign and
defence policy. Again, an extremely limited (perceived) margin of manoeuvre
reveals tight control by the capital and a marginal role for Brussels diplomats.
CFSP/CSDP would, in this scenario, still be dictated and controlled by the cap-
itals of member states. During negotiations, diplomats enjoy little strategic lee-
way while, at best, they are allowed to drift away from the mandate only for
tactical reasons, with the explicit approval of the government. Since they are
directly accountable to their ministers (and ministries), their potential to act
autonomously is limited (Häge 2007: 310). On the other hand, a considerable
(perceived) margin of manoeuvre in CFSP/CSDP negotiations would suggest
that PRs have acquired a prominent part in EU decision-making processes.
The capital has become increasingly dependent on the European level. A pro-
cess of ‘Europeanisation of time’ may be under way (Ekengren and Sundelius
2004: 119) since the pace of work in the Council is so intense that national
representatives often get the necessary documents at the very last minute (Ege-
berg et al. 2003). The ministry simply does not have the time to process them,
and eventually instruct its delegates in Brussels. In this vein, EU foreign and
defence policy is increasingly shaped in Brussels by national representatives,
more easily permeated by EU perspectives, and potentially formulated accord-
ing to common deﬁnitions of issues and problems.
In order to analyse and test these three dimensions, all
5 the national
diplomats involved in the CFSP/CSDP decision-making process have been
considered and are the population of the research. A closed-ended question-
naire has been administered to the about 30 CFSP and CSDP working
groups, Political and Security Committee (PSC), Relex Counsellors, EU Mili-
tary Committee, etc. The response rate was 36 per cent: 114 questionnaires
were received by mail and another 24 were compiled online (for a total num-
ber of 138). Data from all 27 member states were collected. In addition, 20
in-depth interviews with national ofﬁcials were conducted to gain a more in-
depth understanding of certain issues and to better interpret the quantitative
data.
6
Empirical Analysis
Presenting the Data
(a) Quantity and quality of the mandate. The national mandate appears clear:
62.7 per cent assigned a particularly high value (options 5 + 6) and a further
24.8 per cent attributed a score of four. Domestic oversight appears instead
more limited in relation to the level of detail: about 40 per cent agreed that the
1056 N. Chelotti
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 instructions they received were not detailed (options 1 + 2 + 3) and only 7.3
per cent regarded them as extremely detailed (Table 2).
At the same time, if the information ﬂows and contacts between the Euro-
pean and domestic level are intense (71 per cent report that they communicate
with their department every day, and a further 25.4 per cent fairly frequently),
7
this communication is not one-way: it is highly signiﬁcant that civil servants
do not receive instructions every time they meet to discuss foreign policy
issues within the EU. Fewer than one in three respondents state that they
always have a national mandate, and 26.3 per cent claim to receive it only a
‘few times’ or ‘never’ (Table 3).
(b) Relevance of the capital as source of information. A further question
explored the importance Brussels diplomats attach to their capital when they
negotiate in Council committees. Table 4 shows that the national capital,
unsurprisingly, is a very important source of information (the cumulative per-
centage of the options ‘essential’ and ‘fairly important’ is 90.4 per cent). This
is unsurprising given that these ofﬁcials are required to express the national
points of view in those settings.
The option ‘fairly important’, however, was the most frequently selected.
The fact that 46.3 per cent chose the second category (and a further 9.6 per
cent the third or fourth reply) suggests that, the domestic level notwithstanding,
national representatives’ opinions and positions are partly formed in different
contexts and as a consequence of different dynamics. For instance, even if the
TABLE 2
CLEARNESS; DETAIL (%)
‘The instructions coming from my
department are clear’
‘The instructions coming from my
department are detailed’
1 3.7 2.2
2 2.9 21.9
3 5.8 16.1
4 24.8 27.0
5 40.1 25.6
6 22.6 7.3
Total 100 100
Notes: Scale from 1 (‘strongly disagree’)t o6( ‘strongly agree’). Because of rounding, some
columns – in this table and in the following ones – may not sum to 100.
TABLE 3
FREQUENCY (%)
‘Do you have negotiating instructions from your capital?’
1. Yes, always 30.7
2. Often 43.1
3. Few times 24.8
4. Never 1.5
Total 100.0
National Capitals and Brussels in EU Foreign Policy 1057
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 decision-making process of the CFSP/CSDP is centred on the Council,
full-timers recognise that the Commission plays an important part in the daily
management of the CFSP/CSDP. Nearly 70 per cent (68.7 per cent) consider
the role of the Commission ‘crucial’ or ‘important’ for their work; only 7.5 per
cent replied saying that this role is negligible. Similar results are recorded
regarding the inﬂuence of the HR (73.7 per cent and 6 per cent, respectively).
8
(c) Autonomy of the national ofﬁcials. These data indicate that the source of
information is not exclusive (the capital). The ideas and positions of other
actors can have an impact on the activities of national representatives in
Brussels. Margins of manoeuvre thus appear to exist: 49.6 per cent of the
interviewees report they do not feel restricted by their capital, and enjoy enough
freedom in their negotiations (Table 4). This does not imply that Brussels diplo-
mats play the major part in the CFSP decision-making process. Furthermore,
allowing a certain degree of freedom is often a rational strategy for member
states to achieve their aims – provided that discretion is used to pursue exoge-
nously given national interests – deﬁned and closely monitored by the capital.
What the data, however, reveal is that, at minimum, the control of the national
level on PRs is not as strong as some intergovernmentalists may think; they also
indicate that these civil servants are able to infuse, and inﬂuence, negotiations
with their insights and perspectives. Finally, in-depth interviews suggest that, in
some circumstances, it is the European branch that determines the negotiating
position. Diplomats who work every day in Brussels ‘know the general atmo-
sphere of their own group, and those positions and behaviours that can be
accepted and those which are not’.
9 They ‘sometimes have to face advice and
instructions that are outside of the European logic and also counter-productive’.
In these situations, it regularly occurs that ‘colleagues call home to report that
the initial position is not realistic’ and that in order to reach a (reasonable) con-
sensus, ‘it is necessary to change it’.
10 This is more likely to happen when coor-
dination problems within the national administration exist, when the ministries
of Defence and Foreign Affairs hold conﬂicting policy stances, or when the
issues are so technical that people at home do not have the necessary expertise
or time to analyse them. As a result, around 40 per cent of the respondents
indicate that convincing their national administration to modify a negotiating
TABLE 4
CAPITAL AS SOURCE OF INFORMATION; AUTONOMY OF NATIONAL OFFICIALS (%)
‘How important do you consider
your capital as source of
information for your negotiations?’
‘To what extent do you
feel restricted by a negotiation
mandate from your capital?’
1. Essential 44.1 1. Very much 12.4
2. Fairly important 46.3 2. Fairly enough 38.0
3. Little important 8.1 3. Not much, there is enough freedom 49.6
4. Not important at all 1.5 4. There is complete freedom 0.0
Total 100.0 Total 100.0
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 position is a recurrent event; cumulatively, 85.9 per cent acknowledge that it
has occurred sometimes in the groups they belong to (Table 5).
Discussion
All these aspects reveal that the national capital control over CFSP/CSDP
full-timers is effective, but not as tight as often assumed. The two levels are
interconnected, and the formulation of the national position appears to be a
combined activity. How can we interpret this relationship? A strict interpreta-
tion of a Principal–Agent (P–A) approach – on which many (intergovernmen-
tal) readings of the Council and the CFSP/CSDP rely – does not seem useful
in this context. Identifying a clear ‘principal’, who elaborates the national pref-
erence, and an ‘agent’, who maximises that preference, is a difﬁcult task
(Lewis 1998). The European level, certainly well connected with the domestic
bureaucratic structure, nevertheless enjoys a certain margin of (perceived)
autonomy and the possibility to advance its own views. This happens in two
ways. First, the experience acquired in Brussels is a necessary element to
deﬁne the content of the national mandate. The data have shown that Brussels
diplomats have not been delegated merely the function of representing and
defending the position that is prepared by departments in the capital. The infor-
mation ﬂow is two-way: ‘interaction between the two levels is the key word’,
a national ofﬁcial reveals.
11 Only 30 per cent claim to always have a mandate;
in some cases it happens that Brussels diplomats write instructions for them-
selves and then inform the ministry about what they are going to negotiate
(Juncos and Pomorska 2011). As a CIVCOM delegate said, ‘instructions from
capital are essentially based on proposals sent by the Permanent Representa-
tion’.
12 The subject of the delegation is thus wider and also concerns the
elaboration of (part of) the position. Second, Brussels bureaucrats are important
players in the negotiation process itself. They know how negotiations are
structured and likely to evolve, and what resources are needed in that game.
Given their central position and the information asymmetries that emerge
between them and their superiors, participants in CFSP/CSDP committees have
detailed information on the nature and intensity of other actors’ preferences,
and know what is appropriate and possible to achieve in those settings.
TABLE 5
POSITION SHIFTS (%)
‘Has it ever occurred that any member of your
group, disagreeing with the position supported by her
own department, acted so as to convince her capital?’
1. Yes, it occurs frequently 39.6
2. Yes, but it occurs rarely 46.3
3. No, it has never occurred 14.2
Total 100
National Capitals and Brussels in EU Foreign Policy 1059
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 These results are largely consistent with the ﬁndings of the volume edited
by Kassim et al. (2001) on the national coordination of EU policy at the
European level. Employing a different methodology – case studies of 11
PRs – and concentrating essentially on the European Community, their analysis
demonstrates how PRs participate in the deﬁnition of the national position. As
a French civil servant said (in Kassim and Peters 2001: 337), ‘I have been sur-
prised, since my arrival [in Brussels], by the degree to which our work
involves formulating policy with Paris as opposed to simply executing policies
formulated in Paris’. However, if these studies mostly explored information-
gathering and de-brieﬁng on the part of ofﬁcials, this article has further
illustrated the degree of discretion the participants in CFSP/CSDP committees
enjoy – even occasionally convincing their own capital to change the original
position. Persuading the domestic level to accept a better argument raised by
another member state would be the most convincing ‘smoking gun’ for a
supranational reading of the Council (Lewis 2008).
Not surprisingly, a ﬁnal query fully conﬁrms the image of a joint decision-
making process and blurred boundaries between the national administration and
Brussels. Table 6 reveals that 75.6 per cent of the interviewees give a well-bal-
anced evaluation of their power relationship: the links are dynamic and open,
and both levels contribute to the formulation of the national policy. Moreover,
diplomats who consider the PRs to be the principal actors are more numerous
than those who support a strictly intergovernmental image of the Council.
Advancing Explanatory Variables
The analysis so far has offered a general representation of the links between
capitals and Brussels in EU foreign and defence policy. However, member
states develop different institutional arrangements for coordinating European
policy. For instance, countries like the United Kingdom, Sweden and France
tend to exert tight control on their civil servants, whereas more decentralised
coordination systems guarantee a wide margin for manoeuvre for the represen-
tatives of Luxembourg, Belgium and Italy (Beyers and Trondal 2004; Kassim
and Peters 2001). Even within the same country, ministerial control can vary
from issue to issue (Fabbrini and Piattoni 2008).
TABLE 6
OVERALL ASSESSMENT (%)
‘How do you assess the overall power relationships between the ofﬁcials in Brussels and those
in the capital?’
1. It is an open and dynamic relation: both parts contribute to the formulation of
the position
75.6
2. It is a basically unilateral relation: the national capital deﬁnes the position and
Brussels defends it
8.1
3. Brussels plays the major part, as it is at the heart of the CFSP decision-making
process
14.1
4. Other 2.2
Total 100.0
1060 N. Chelotti
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 Consequently, this section introduces and tests some explanations of
variation in the experiences of national servants. To evaluate control on the
European level, the same three elements that have previously deﬁned the links
between the domestic ministry and Brussels – (a) the clearness, detail and
frequency of the mandate; (b) the relevance of the capital for diplomats’
activities; and (c) the margin of ofﬁcials’ autonomy – are used here as outcome
variables. First, explanatory elements linked to the institutional context
(Working Groups versus PSC; CFSP versus CSDP) are investigated. Next, the
analysis statistically tests variables at the micro-level (EU Career; Seniority)
and macro-level (Polity; Europeanism; Power).
The Institutional Context: Working Groups versus PSC
A research design widely used by the literature on EU committees examines the
activities that take place in those settings through comparative lenses. The sam-
ple includes expert groups, Council working groups (CWGs) and comitology
committees. This allows researchers to assess the results controlling for contex-
tual factors, as these groups and committees have different degrees of politicisa-
tion, network characteristics and rules (Egeberg et al. 2003). If different
institutional contexts and afﬁliations lead to different experiences, ministerial
control and bureaucratic leeway are likely to vary in the case of the ofﬁcials par-
ticipating in CWGs and of the diplomats sitting in the PSC. Expectations are
mixed. On the one hand, CWGs deal with CFSP dossiers in the ﬁrst stages of the
decision-making process, and their participants are often experts in that ﬁeld.
The capital could have fewer opportunities and incentives to control their work.
Similarly, senior ofﬁcials in the PSC are closer to the heart of the decision-mak-
ing process: national priorities are likely to emerge here with greater force. On
the other side, the PSC is a more senior and less transparent body; agreements
are taken with minor involvement of external actors, including the capital. PSC
representatives are thus expected to enjoy wider margins of manoeuvre.
The picture that emerges from the data
13 is relatively clear: oversight by
the national capital is stronger in the case of CWGs. All the statistics (but one,
where the difference is nevertheless small) lead to the same reading (Table 7).
Only 23.8 per cent (26.9 per cent) of the interviewees – compared with 42.3
per cent (40.6 per cent) of CWGs delegates – afﬁrm, for instance, having a
mandate when they negotiate in the PSC. Some ofﬁcials who belong to, or
have experience of, both groups conﬁrm that in the PSC ‘there is greater free-
dom’, and ‘the government hand penetrates less deeply’. Furthermore, PSC
ofﬁcials have a higher level of seniority (ambassadorial rank), which ensures
greater autonomy.
14
The Institutional Context: CFSP versus CSDP
Another institutional factor that may have an impact on the activities of these
committees concerns the different features and rules that characterise the CFSP
National Capitals and Brussels in EU Foreign Policy 1061
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 and CSDP. It may well be that these two regimes demand different coordina-
tion and negotiating styles. Only national policy-makers, with their mandate
legitimised at the domestic level, can launch a military operation and endanger
their own soldiers’ lives. Accordingly, the national hold is likely to be stronger
in defence policy. However, the data do not support this claim (Table 7). The
statistics show relatively close and/or contrasting values. Instructions are
clearer, but less detailed, for CSFP representatives. If CSDP ofﬁcials pay more
attention to the national level, a negotiating mandate is available more fre-
quently in the case of foreign policy. Finally, there are not big differences in
the (perceived) margins of freedom between the two groups.
Between Micro and Macro: More Explanatory Variables
The control of the capital over the activities of its ofﬁcials in Brussels may
depend on the individual experiences of the ofﬁcials themselves:
15 a greater
number of years spent in the CFSP/CSDP can enhance their trust vis-à-vis the
capital. Besides, people in PRs can use information and knowledge asymme-
tries to increase their autonomy (Kassim and Peters 2001: 307). Along similar
lines, the same trust and negotiating leeway can be generated by a long overall
career in national ministries, foreign embassies and PRs. Junior ofﬁcials are
more likely to be kept on a tight leash by their ministry (Howorth 2010). The
hypotheses can be formulated as follows: the longer the career in European
affairs (H1: EU Career), the longer the overall career of a national diplomat
(H2: Seniority), the less tight the control of the capital on Brussels will be.
16
On the other hand, some variables at the macro level can be tested to
analyse their impact on the domestic oversight of Brussels bureaucrats. First,
the level of decentralisation and the existence of a multi-level governance
within a country can be positively associated with a greater discretion of
TABLE 7
CFSP WORKING GROUPS AND PSC; CFSP AND CSDP (%)
CFSP
CWGs PSC CFSP CSDP
N =
43
N =
27
N =
51
N =
21
N =
94
N =
59
N =
76
N =
54
Instructions are clear
1 95.2 100 80.4 85 87.1 93.3 82.9 87.1
Instructions are detailed
1 52.4 53.8 56.9 55 54.9 56.9 64.5 68.5
I ‘always’ have negotiating instructions
2 40.6 42.3 26.9 23.8 34.4 35.6 27.6 29.7
The negotiating mandate is constraining
3 47.6 53.8 46.2 51.9 46.8 54.2 48.7 51.9
The capital is the ‘essential’ source of
information
2
42.9 50 38.5 33.3 42.6 42.4 47.3 48.4
1Options 4 + 5 + 6 (6-point scale).
2Option 1 (4-point scale).
3Options ‘very much’ and ‘fairly enough’ (4-point scale).
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 national ofﬁcials (H3: Polity). A more decentralised system of preference for-
mation (with a bigger role assigned to PRs) is more easily accepted in a multi-
layered constitutional culture (Beyers and Trondal 2004: 928–29).
17
Second, states that share a widespread consensus on the beneﬁts of an EU
foreign policy tend to rely more on their national servants in Brussels; at the
same time, more sceptical countries employ a higher number of ofﬁcials to bet-
ter monitor them (Kassim and Peters 2001: 327). To measure these orienta-
tions, two proxies are used: ﬁrst, the attitude of the national elite towards the
CFSP/CSDP (H4a: Elite). Research conducted by the Commission in 1996 on
top decision-makers’ opinions on EU foreign and defence policy provides the
necessary information. These data are available for only 15 countries. Conse-
quently, information on public opinion is used (H4b: Public Opinion) to cover
also those countries that joined the EU between 2004 and 2007 (Eurobarome-
ter surveys).
Finally, a last explanatory variable is closely related to the ﬁeld of
international relations and an intergovernmental reading of the CFSP/CSDP. A
common (realist) assumption is that the most powerful states have fewer
interests in pooling their sovereignty in such a delicate sector, as they are able
to conduct independent foreign policies and prefer not to be tied by interna-
tional/European commitments. As a result, they are expected to give more
importance to the control of their own servants in Brussels, whereas smaller
states’ representatives are likely to enjoy more leeway in their work
(H5: Power).
18
The ﬁve explanatory variables are summarised in Table 8. The three
outcome variables (Frequency, Clearness, Detail of the Mandate; Source;
Autonomy of the Ofﬁcials – see Table 1) have a natural ordering, but the
distance between levels is unknown. As a result, an ordered probit regression
is employed. On each of the outcome variables two different regressions are
run: ﬁrst, with the following explanatory variables (EU Career; Seniority;
Public Opinion; Power); next, Polity and Elite are added.
19 The reason for this
lies in the different N of the explanatory variables: as the research selects a
listwise approach,
20 considering the data for just 15 countries would seriously
limit the analysis.
TABLE 8
BETWEEN MICRO AND MACRO: SOME EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Hypotheses
Relation with greater
negotiating autonomy
Relation with
stricter national
control Operationalisation
(1) EU career Positive Negative Questionnaire
(2) Seniority Positive Negative Questionnaire
(3) Polity Positive Negative Hooghe–Marks
index
(4a) Elite (4b) Public opinion Positive Negative Eurobarometer
(5) Power Negative Positive CIMC
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 Results
This section presents the results of the regression analyses (Table 9). Concern-
ing the quantity and quality of the mandate they show a very clear picture. Only
one variable turned out to be statistically signiﬁcant: the relative power of EU
member states. Ceteris paribus, more powerful states are more likely to prepare
clearer and more detailed instructions for their delegates, and do it more often
than smaller states. The control of larger (in terms of military capabilities) states
on their representatives in Brussels is thus stricter. All six regressions yielded
statistically signiﬁcant results in the case of the Power variable. The intergov-
ernmental expectation is conﬁrmed also in the case of the second outcome vari-
able: diplomats from larger member states are more likely to consider the
capital as an important source for their negotiations. No other variable can
explain the importance national ofﬁcials attach to their capital. As the interpreta-
tion of coefﬁcients of ordered probit models is not straightforward, the marginal
effects (of only the variables that are signiﬁcant) are reported (Table 10): they
indicate the effect of a one-unit increase in the independent variables (at their
mean) on outcome variables. In particular (ﬁrst regression), as Power is up by
one point (from a mean of 7.5), probabilities of always receiving a mandate are
expected to increase by almost 3 per cent. Similarly, probabilities of considering
the capital as the essential source rise by 3.6 per cent (from a mean of 7.2). The
second regression reports similar results.
Receiving a negotiating mandate more often, with clearer and more detailed
instructions, and more frequently regarding the capital as the essential source
of negotiations, is expected to show a strong relationship between military
power and the representatives’ leeway as well. Being monitored more closely,
national servants from larger member states will have less discretion in their
activities. The two regressions do not conﬁrm this reading, however: in both
cases the relationship is weak and not signiﬁcant. One other variable explains
the relative freedom of CFSP/CSDP diplomats. Running the ﬁrst regression, it
emerges that those diplomats with a long career in the EU are more likely to
have more space for manoeuvre than ofﬁcials with limited experience. As EU
career is increased by one point (from a mean of 2.9 years), probabilities of
feeling very much restricted by the national mandate decrease by 3.6 per cent.
On the other hand, national ofﬁcials are more likely (by 7.4 per cent) to sustain
that they enjoy enough freedom when negotiating in Council committees (from
a mean of 4.2 years). Adding Elite and Polity, the relevance of the time spent
in EU decision-making is conﬁrmed.
Discussion
The regressions indicate that the relationship between capitals and Brussels
can be explained by the military power of member states, and the years spent
by diplomats in the EU decision-making process. How do we interpret
these apparently contradictory results? In effect, the picture appears quite
unambiguous: more powerful countries attempt to impose tighter control on
1066 N. Chelotti
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 EU foreign and defence policy. The neorealist expectation that larger EU
states, being more reluctant to delegate or pool their sovereignty, provide their
delegates with more frequent, detailed and clear instructions, is conﬁrmed.
However, this stricter control does not seem to translate into the level of dis-
cretion enjoyed by national representatives. Once ofﬁcials reach the stage of
negotiation, the dynamics that determine their amount of leeway are explained
by another factor. Here, the factors allowing them a signiﬁcant role in formu-
lating the national position are cumulative experience gained, knowledge of
EU and domestic contexts, and knowledge of their relative (formal and infor-
mal) codes of conduct. In the words of an ofﬁcial:
at the beginning you don’t realise when and how (and to what extent)
you have a certain margin of manoeuvre in your committee … It is
something that you learn over time, when you get to know the dynamics
between Brussels and your own department.
21
Again, this allows them not just to relay back a great deal of information (and
even relaying back may be selective), or just to advise the capital on what
positions are realistic, but also to formulate the national policy. In other words,
if government input can be convincingly explained by the amount of power
held by member states, the effective discretion/autonomy of diplomats depends
on the time spent in the EU decision-making process.
Conclusion
Through an original database of 138 questionnaires (and 20 interviews) with
national ofﬁcials working in CFSP/CSDP committees, the article has offered a
nuanced picture of the dynamics that characterise the formulation of the
national position inside those settings. The control of the centre over
representatives in Brussels is far from being as tight as a strictly intergovern-
mental reading of the EU would predict. Assuming a ‘unidirectional causal
chain’–starting with the domestic level ‘and translated through state to the
national … positions which are then represented in Brussels negotiations’
(Lewis 2000: 265–66) – and the state as a unitary actor does not describe what
happens in the CFSP/CSDP. The relationship of representatives in Council
committees with the central administration is open, with both levels formulat-
ing the negotiating position. Furthermore, half feel sufﬁciently free in the activ-
ities they take part in. These ﬁndings are even more revealing for the study of
the Council and international negotiations, as the national control is widely
assumed to be at its strongest in foreign policy. Next, a few explanatory
variables have been introduced to explain the different coordination efforts of
the capital: CWGs are more controlled than the PSC, while there have not
been appreciable differences between the CFSP and CSDP. Variables at the
micro-level (national ofﬁcials’ experiences) and macro-level (state characteris-
tics) have been tested: the features of the mandate are explained by states’
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 military capabilities, and diplomats’ negotiating freedom by the years spent in
the Council. Future research should also test these variables in case studies,
and explore how they eventually combine in single policy dossiers. Other fac-
tors could also be considered: the mandate and representatives’ leeway may
vary according to the nature (and salience) of the issue and to the type of
CFSP/CSDP operation.
The results of this article are also relevant for theoretical reasons. For
instance, they can offer useful insights to better analyse EU foreign and
defence policy, and provide implications for the two different perspectives
(intergovernmental and institutional) on the CFSP/CSDP decision-making
process. In conclusion, three observations can be advanced. First, if a strictly
intergovernmental image of the formulation of the national position is con-
tradicted, this does not indicate that intergovernmental studies do not explain
the decision-making process of the Council and CFSP/CSDP. For instance,
showing that the deﬁnition of the position is a joint process does not mean that
states do not pursue the national preference. National ofﬁcials, even when
enjoying sufﬁcient leeway, can nevertheless advance their own interpretations
of broader national guidelines.
22 However, opening up the black box of the
state and admitting the possibility of European inputs informing negotiations
pose remarkable challenges to an intergovernmental reading of the Council.
One way to take into account the evidence this article has offered would
be to make a more nuanced and explicit use of a P–A approach. The capital
delegates a much more signiﬁcant and sensitive function: (part of) the prepara-
tion of the national position, and not only its negotiation in Brussels. The
domestic level has indeed several incentives to delegate such a function: reduc-
ing information asymmetries, economising on transaction costs, improving the
efﬁciency of the national decision-making process and the quality of the policy,
etc. – thus saving the capital’s time and resources. After all, Brussels delegates
are national public servants temporarily assigned to national PRs. However,
several problems may arise in applying a P–A approach to this intra-bureau-
cratic delegation. First, the data seem to suggest that the two levels are increas-
ingly blurred: it is often difﬁcult to identify who is the principal and who is
the agent. Second, principals should be aware of the act of the delegation – or,
at least, of its consequences and the importance of (credible) control mecha-
nisms. Arguably, the mandate is the major control mechanism when the capital
delegates the function of negotiating a certain policy. However, the design of
delegation and control mechanisms is only loosely present when it comes to
the (eventual) delegation of the elaboration of the position. Third, most P–A
studies consider asymmetries in preferences, and incentive incompatibility,
between principal and agents as one of their core features (Miller 2005: 205) –
which does not necessarily occur in the case of the capital and PRs. Finally,
the fact that the most important source of agents’ autonomy is not related to
the control mechanisms at the disposal of the capital (the mandate, for
instance), but to the number of years spent in the Council, challenges
profoundly the validity of a P–A approach (Pollack 2007).
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 Second, in few cases institutional analyses have shown how and where
socialisation and/or deliberative processes can impact on national positions
inside the Council. As mentioned in the introduction, the mechanisms remain
at best implicit; the domestic level, and the national/supranational nexus, are
absent, or bracketed. This article has demonstrated that the European level –
far from being unconnected with the national capital – nevertheless plays a
relevant role in the formulation and negotiation of EU foreign policy, with a
certain level of discretion. It has not demonstrated that a problem-solving
approach characterises the CFSP/CSDP decision-making process or that spe-
ciﬁc member states’ policies have changed during negotiations. What has been
indicated are the conditions for that to happen in several cases. The ﬁndings of
this article can therefore provide a micro-foundation for these analyses of the
Council and the CFSP/CSDP.
Finally, investigating the relationship between the ministry and Brussels
may connect the literature on socialisation with Europeanisation studies (Müller
and Alecu de Flers 2009: 19–23). Scholars have traditionally focused on long-
term changes, often in the culture and identity of national society and state
actors. However, there are two further avenues through which the EU ‘hits’
member states. Socialisation processes can change member states’ policies not
only in the medium–long run, but also during the negotiation process itself
(Checkel 1999). Again, the role of change agents is played by national ofﬁcials
who are at the crossroads of domestic and European settings. Finally, European
input can enter the national decision-making process from the outset: as an
Antici counsellor reported (in Lewis 1998: 491), ‘[i]nstructions already contain
a big Brussels element in them, and sometimes they are Brussels instructions …
sometimes they just copy our reports into instructions’. If the formulation of the
national position is shared between the domestic and European branches of the
national administration, and if the latter is embedded in a European context with
common values and ideas, European elements can mould and Europeanise
national (foreign) policy through diplomats in Brussels. Although methodologi-
cally difﬁcult to detect, this Europeanisation through national representatives
can nonetheless be an important feature of EU decision-making dynamics.
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Notes
1. See Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (1997: 40). Using more sophisticated data, Häge (2008)
calculated that Council working groups and COREPER account respectively for 43 per cent
and 22 per cent of legislative acts, while the remaining 35 per cent is evaluated by ministers.
In foreign policy, Juncos and Pomorska (2011) argue that around one-third of the issues are
discussed by ministers.
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 2. Although the distinction between diplomats in Brussels and their counterparts in the national
capital is not as strict and clear-cut as assumed (since the former may be relocated to the
home department after the experience in the EU), it is therefore analytically necessary, and
empirically, theoretically and normatively justiﬁed.
3. In order to avoid subsequent criticisms and problems, national delegates in Brussels may
occasionally ask to receive an explicit mandate.
4. Leeway/discretion/autonomy are here only loosely deﬁned, and broadly used to evaluate the
degree of freedom these ofﬁcials perceive when negotiating in CFSP/CSDP committees.
Although the exact meaning is left to the interviewee, they offer indications of the space of
manoeuvre Brussels diplomats may have in the CFSP/CSDP decision-making process in general.
5. There are two exceptions. For logistical reasons, national diplomats who are only partially
involved in Council negotiations and who reside in the national capital have been excluded.
Only full-timers have therefore been considered. The second exception follows the beginning
of ﬁeld research: two speciﬁc parties (COREPER II and the Antici Group) replied that their
handling of CFSP/CSDP issues was extremely limited.
6. The questionnaires were sent between April and July 2008, while the interviews were con-
ducted between July and August 2007 and May and July 2008. The research was conducted
before the treaty of Lisbon came into force (December 2009). In spite of the changes that have
been introduced in the CFSP/CSDP governance (among others, the creation of the new dou-
ble-hatted High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the
launch of the European External Action Service), the decision-making rules and logics remain
the same: decisions are made by the Council, and representatives of EU member states, almost
exclusively by unanimity, with a very limited involvement by other actors. The most relevant
innovation may concern the diminished role of the rotating presidency in the CFSP/CSDP: the
meetings of the Council for Foreign Affairs, PSC and working groups are now chaired almost
exclusively by the High Representative and her staff. To what extent, and in what ways, this
can affect CFSP/CSDP negotiations, is uncertain and requires further investigation.
7. Table not reported.
8. Tables not reported.
9. Interview (6), Belgian ofﬁcial, May 2008.
10. Interview (8), French ofﬁcial, May 2008. For similar statements, see Juncos and Pomorska
(2006) and Juncos and Reynolds (2007).
11. Interview (6), Belgian ofﬁcial, May 2008.
12. Interview (17), CIVCOM ofﬁcial, July 2008.
13. The 138 cases of the research have been divided into three categories: (a) delegates in CFSP
working groups; (b) delegates in the PSC (and those working closely with them – Nicolaidis
group – or with the capital, Relex Counsellors); (c) delegates who deal with CSDP issues. If
national ofﬁcials participate in more than one category, two strategies have been pursued:
ﬁrst, their scores have been counted for each group (N = 162). Second, to accentuate the vari-
ance, only the participants in just one of the three groups have been considered (N = 108).
14. Interview (11), Nicolaidis delegate, June 2008; Interview (2), Italian ofﬁcial, August 2007. How-
ever, a partial explanation may lie in the different kind of scrutiny (ex post versus ex ante) the
PSC may experience, as its reports (and positions) – dealing with more relevant dossiers – are
more likely to be read (ex post) by the capital. On the contrary, the outputs of the CWGs, having
less signiﬁcant and immediate consequences, are more likely to be left unchecked (ex post).
15. Other variables can play a role in explaining variance in the European–domestic nexus.
Political salience is certainly one of those. The domestic level may have incentives to leave
PRs more room for manoeuvre (both in the formulation of the position, and in the negotiation
process) if the issue has little salience (or is highly uncontroversial) for a country’s foreign
policy. In this article, the unit of analysis is the single interviewee/diplomat: it can safely be
assumed that each of them has handled both more and less politically sensitive dossiers. In
other words, political salience can be considered as distributed normally among the population
of this research. Furthermore, whereas certain groups of diplomats are constantly biased in
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 one direction (for instance, the PSC is supposed to deal with more sensitive issues than
CWGs), the data shown above reveal a different – the PSC has relatively more autonomy –
and more complex reality, and would suggest further investigation.
16. Both variables are operationalised through the number of years respondents spent, respec-
tively, in the EU; and in domestic + international + European professional settings.
17. To operationalise this variable, I relied on the regional governance index prepared by Hooghe
and Marks (2001). The reference year is 2000, and data are available for the then-15 members
of the EU. It follows that this variable was tested only for these countries.
18. Power is here understood in terms of military capabilities. Koenig-Archibugi (2004) measures
member states’ power capabilities using the Composite Index of Material Capabilities (CIMC)
developed by the Correlates of War Project. What is relevant for his analysis is the percentage
of power each state possesses in relation to the other EU member states rather than to all
states in the international system. The same purpose is shared in this research. The reference
year is 2001. The scale goes from 0.03 (Malta) to 18.82 (Germany).
19. At the same time, Public Opinion – since it measures the same variable as Elite – has been
excluded from the second regression.
20. The objective is to make the analysis more robust and accurate; on the other hand, the
missing cases are random and limited.
21. Interview (8), French ofﬁcial, May 2008.
22. Interview (19), Italian ofﬁcial, July 2008.
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